【公开学术报告】Firms’ Camouflage: How Do Firms Deter Potential Rivals?

Firms’ Camouflage: How Do Firms Deter Potential Rivals?

Guest Speaker: Xuan Li (The Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Date & Time: Wednesday, November 20, 2024, 10:00 - 11:30 am (Beijing Time)

Zoom Meeting ID: 88361173557 (Password: 906212)

Join via the Link:  https://us02web.zoom.us/j/88361173557

ABSTRACT

This study presents evidence that firms can employ accounting techniques as a camouflage to deter market entry. We theorize that incumbent firms have the incentives to use accounting techniques to influence how potential rivals assess and evaluate the profitability of the market space of the incumbent firms. Using a panel data of publicly traded firms, our findings provide strong support for our theory.

Keywords:

Earnings management; market entry threats; entry deterrence; analyst coverage