【公开学术报告】Similarity-Attraction vs. Similarity-Competition: How Board Chairs Select Independent Directors with Background Similarity?

Topic: Similarity-Attraction vs. Similarity-Competition:How Board Chairs Select Independent Directors with Background Similarity?

Date & Time: 9:30-11:00, Thur. 13^th, December, 2018

Venue: Room 2101, Tongji Building A

Language: English

Speaker：Dr. Renfei GAO (University of Melbourne)

ABSTRACT

Research suggests that board chairs prefer to select similar directors to them. This literature mainly focuses on the positive/collaborative aspect of chair-director relations, yet the potential negative/competitive aspect remains underexplored. Emphasizing the dual roles of directors as both collaborators and competitors, as perceived by chairs, we incorporate both similarity-attraction and similarity-competition logics in director selection and develop a substitutive-complementary framework to reconcile their contrasting implications. Using longitudinal data on 1,180 Chinese listed firms, we find that chairs with political backgrounds are less inclined to select similar directors, supporting the similarity-competition logic; while chairs with technological backgrounds are more inclined to select directors with technological backgrounds, supporting the similarity-attraction logic. Additionally, we find positive moderating effects of firms’ resource dependence in political and technological domains. Emphasizing a “co-opetition” view, our study advances the understanding of chair-director relations from the socialized perspective.