Date & Time: 9:30-11:00 am, Sat. 2nd, November 2019
Venue: Room 2101, Tongji Building A
Language: English
Speaker:Dr. Can Ouyang 欧阳璨(Cornell University)
ABSTRACT
Even though the presence of Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed economies have grown substantially, the knowledge about how these firms manage their developed-market subsidiaries remain rather scant. This study applies agency theory to explore how ownership type influences Chinese MNCs’ control over developed-market subsidiaries. Findings based on the qualitative data and survey data collected from Chinese MNCs demonstrate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-sector businesses (PSBs) experience different agency problems in developed markets and thus apply different control strategies. SOEs tend to adopt a hybridization control system that separates the management of home-country expatriates and employees hired locally, whereas PSBs are likely to implement a relational control system that strengthens the interdependence between headquarters and subsidiaries. This study provides implications to the literature on agency theory and control theory and advances the research of emerging market MNCs.