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Why ACOs Leave: Risk Sensitivity, Ratchet Effects, and Optimal Payment Design in MSSP

INFORMATION | 课程信息

讲者:   Dr. Dawei Jian 美国威斯康辛大学助理教授

时间：2026年6月16日（周二） 10时

地点:   同济大厦A座509教室

ABSTRACT | 课程摘要

Firms are increasingly exposed to socio-political shocks that alter their nonmarket environment, yet research has focused mainly on aggregate firm-level responses rather than on how such shocks propagate within firms. We address this gap by examining how U.S. state-level anti-ESG legislation affects facility-level greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Because these laws target ESG-related financial and political pressures at the corporate level rather than facility-level environmental regulation, they provide a useful setting for studying headquarters-level shocks and their intra-firm transmission. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design across 19 states that adopted anti-ESG laws between 2021 and 2023, we find that when a firm’s headquarters state enacts such a law, GHG emissions increase at the firm’s facilities. The increase is concentrated in facilities outside anti-ESG states, stronger for firms with greater prior ESG-finance exposure and for facilities in more climate-stringent environments, and weaker where harder local constraints, such as carbon-market participation, are present. The effect appears in investor-visible GHG emissions but not in toxic releases or production-scale outcomes. These findings are most consistent with a headquarters-level ESG-finance shock that transmits selectively across facilities, producing cross-state policy spillovers through firms’ internal structures.

GUEST BIO | 讲者介绍

Dr. Dawei Jian is an Assistant Professor in Supply Chain & Operations Management at the Lubar College of Business, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. His research focuses on incentives and information management within business contexts, especially in the areas of supply chain management, compensation design, healthcare operations, and OM-Marketing interface. The methodologies are dynamic optimization, game theory, mechanism design, information design, and structural modeling. His work has been published in Management Science and Production and Operations Management.